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The 2012 US presidential election inverts the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of the candidates in 2008: Barack Obama is now tough and experienced, Mitt 
Romney a diplomatic neophyte. One of John McCain’s more memorable asser-
tions in 2008 was that he would ‘follow Osama Bin Laden to the gates of hell’.1 
Obama’s actions have spoken louder than McCain’s hyperbole. On 2 May 2011, 
the President sanctioned a navy SEAL raid that killed Bin Laden in Pakistan. The 
boldness of this decision—in declining to inform Pakistan of US intentions and 
in using ground forces instead of launching an air strike—has largely armoured 
Obama against Republican attacks on his alleged lack of fortitude. So where can 
Romney land meaningful blows now?
Romney’s main problem is that he is running against an incumbent who—
through a step-change in the frequency, audacity and lethality of drone attacks—
has waged war on Al-Qaeda arguably more effectively than his predecessor (and 
unarguably at a lower human and financial cost).2 In this context, how does 
Romney communicate a greater desire to confront America’s enemies without 
sounding like Barry Goldwater in 1964, whose belligerence was an electoral 
godsend to Lyndon Johnson. Romney is rarely less convincing than when 
seeking to out-hawk Obama on facing down Iran, Russia—‘without question 
our number one geopolitical foe’—and China.3 Perhaps it is self-awareness that 
explains his discomfort in espousing such views: for Romney’s working methods 
and operating principles closely resemble those of Obama.
Both men are results-driven and leery of ideology. Both believe that the extent of 
America’s decline has been overstated. Both nonetheless recognize that the nation’s 
resources are finite. And both appreciate that few crises are as straightforward 
as idealistic observers on both sides of the political spectrum would have them 
appear. In October 2011, Romney delivered a speech at the Citadel in Charleston, 
1 Ken Gude, ‘John McCain versus Osama bin Laden’, Guardian, 1 Aug. 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2008/aug/01/johnmccain.usforeignpolicy, accessed 18 July 2012.
2 On Obama’s strenuous counterterrorism efforts, see Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. 
O’Hanlon, Bending history: Barack Obama’s foreign policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 
chs 3, 6. The negative unintended effects of drone attacks are discussed in Akbar Ahmed’s forthcoming book 
The thistle and the drone: how America’s war on terror became a global war on tribal Islam (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2013).
3 Interview with Mitt Romney, CNN, 26 March 2012, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1203/26/
sitroom.01.html, accessed 18 July 2012.
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South Carolina that was widely reported for its bellicosity on Iran. During that 
same speech, however, he also made an important cautionary point: ‘Our next 
President will face many difficult and complex foreign policy decisions. Few will 
be black and white.’4 Barack Obama could hardly dispute the wisdom of this 
remark. Time and again he voices a variation on the same theme.
This article will consider the intellectual sources of the candidates’ foreign 
policies. It will examine both the pertinent experiences and mindsets of each, and 
the advisers employed to provide external stimuli to their thought and action. 
It is impossible to gauge the relative significance of these two sets of sources. In 
2008, pundits (including this author) ruminated on the advisers likely to feature 
in the Obama administration and later drew conclusions as the composition of the 
Cabinet and the National Security Council (NSC) was announced.5 The balance 
then appeared poised between Wilsonian-inclined idealists such as Susan E. 
Rice, Samantha Power and Anne-Marie Slaughter, and supposedly more ‘realist’ 
thinkers such as Robert Gates, James Jones and Thomas Donilon. Yet focusing 
on the appointments obscured as much as it revealed. The President himself has 
dominated the foreign policy-making process in a manner redolent of John F. 
Kennedy. No Acheson, Dulles, Kissinger, Brzezinski or Shultz has emerged to 
take the diplomatic lead. The dominant foreign policy voice within the Obama 
administration is Barack Obama’s. And that voice is steeped in the distinctly 
American philosophical tradition of pragmatism.
Thanks to his remarkable political contortions—geared to securing the 
Republican nomination, but a sight to behold nonetheless—Mitt Romney’s 
foreign policy views are harder to pin down with certainty. This makes it tempting 
to assemble his diplomatic world-view through the lens of the advisory company 
he keeps, which includes the likes of Robert Kagan, Cofer Black, John Bolton, 
Aaron L. Friedberg and Eliot Cohen. This would be a mistake—just as it was 
with Obama in 2008. The entirety of Romney’s career, including the manner in 
which he made his fortune, his role in rescuing from ignominy the Salt Lake City 
Winter Olympics in 2002, his governorship of Massachusetts and his failed bid for 
the Republican nomination in 2008, all provide important clues as to his likely 
foreign policy disposition.
In March 2012, Reverend Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention 
told the Romney campaign that it could win over ‘recalcitrant conservatives’ by 
‘previewing a few Cabinet selections: Santorum as attorney general, Gingrich 
as ambassador to the United Nations and John Bolton as secretary of state’. 
Writing in The Nation, Ari Berman observes ominously that this scenario ‘is more 
plausible than you might think’.6 Really? There is little evidence from Romney’s 
career to suggest that he would be so foolish. Romney won the governorship 
of Massachusetts because he knows where to find the centre. He sought out the 
4 ‘Mitt Romney delivers remarks on U.S. foreign policy’, 7 Oct. 2011, http://www.mittromney.com/blogs/
mitts-view/2011/10/mitt-romney-delivers-remarks-us-foreign-policy, accessed 18 July 2012.
5 See e.g. David Milne, ‘Obama’s foreign policy picks’, Los Angeles Times, 7 Nov. 2008, http://www.latimes.
com/news/opinion/la-oe-milne7-2008nov07,0,2236272.story, accessed 18 July 2012.
6 Land quoted in Ari Berman, ‘Mitt Romney’s neocon war cabinet’, The Nation, 2 May 2012.
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median voter in both Republican primaries. The Tea Party ensured that this 
point was further to the right than at any time in his party’s history. But the key 
point is that Romney is hardwired to operate in the middle ground of whatever 
constituency he is charged with persuading. If elevated to the national and 
international stage, this centrism is unlikely to evaporate suddenly as the likes of 
Bolton and Gingrich are given free rein. The main purpose of this dark hypothesis 
is to persuade Obama’s left-leaning supporters to set aside their ennui and vote 
in fear of a trigger-happy alternative. It’s a canny strategy that obscures the 
more complicated reality. Romney and Obama are in fact both results-oriented 
pragmatists whose similarities outweigh their differences. And this, of course, is a 
source of angst to the base of both parties.
The intellectual sources of Barack Obama’s foreign policy
The obvious place to begin when considering Barack Obama’s foreign policy 
views is his speech criticizing the move to war with Iraq in October 2002. The 
context of this speech is vitally important. He was speaking after Reverend Jesse 
Jackson at what was billed as an ‘anti-war rally’ in Chicago. In order of impor-
tance, Obama’s purposes were, first, to distinguish his opposition from that of the 
Democratic left, and second, to attack the Bush administration for rushing into 
a ‘dumb war’. His first sentence conveys as much: ‘Let me begin by saying that 
although this has been billed as an antiwar rally, I stand before you as someone 
who is not opposed to war in all circumstances.’ Indeed, Obama devoted the next 
eight sentences of his speech to explaining why ‘I don’t oppose all wars’. What 
made the proposed war with Iraq so maladroit, in Obama’s view, was its passionate, 
‘ideological’ nature and its disregard for the apparent facts of the matter: ‘that 
Saddam Hussein poses no imminent and direct threat to the United States, or to 
his neighbors … and that in concert with the international community he can be 
contained until, in the way of all petty dictators, he falls away into the dustbin of 
history’. For Obama, launching a war against Saddam Hussein was ‘[a] dumb war. 
A rash war. A war based not on reason but on passion, not on principle but on 
politics.’ ‘What I am opposed to,’ said Obama, ‘is the cynical attempt by Richard 
Perle and Paul Wolfowitz and other armchair, weekend warriors in the adminis-
tration to shove their own ideological agendas down our throats, irrespective of 
the costs in lives lost and in hardships borne.’7 The applause that met the speech 
was decidedly more muted than the reverie stoked by Reverend Jackson’s more 
‘passionate’ address.
It is interesting to compare the attributes valorized by Obama—‘reason’ and 
‘principle’—with those he impugns: ‘passion’, ‘ideology’ and ‘politics’. It was a 
speech that revelled in cold, hard thinking informed by reason and evidence, one 
that decried the consequences of being led by instinctual absolutes. In Reading 
Obama, the intellectual historian James Kloppenberg hails the President as ‘a man 
7 For the full text of the speech, see http://usliberals.about.com/od/extraordinaryspeeches/a/Obama2002War.
htm, accessed 18 July 2012. See also David Remnick, The bridge: the life and rise of Barack Obama (London: 
Picador, 2010), pp. 346–8.
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of ideas’, comparing him in cerebral quality to John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, John Quincy Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson. The primary ideational source of Obama’s political, social and 
diplomatic thought, Kloppenberg argues, is the pragmatism of William James and 
John Dewey.
Obama’s speech attacking the dogma driving the Bush administration to war 
with Iraq certainly provides compelling evidence to support such claims. Obama 
abhors absolutism and is comfortable with pursuing policies that test and probe, 
reaping incremental progress, rather than those that seek to unveil or validate 
universal truths. The world is uncertain and constantly evolving. Framing policies 
informed by modesty and provisionality is the best way to avoid dangerous conflict. 
It is important here to compare this characterization of pragmatism with the more 
pejorative version of common usage, which emphasizes the realization of short-
term gains through excessive compromise. Kloppenberg writes that ‘Pragmatism 
is a philosophy for skeptics, a philosophy for those committed to democratic 
debate and the critical assessment of the results of political decisions, not for true 
believers convinced they know the right course of action in advance of inquiry 
and experimentation. Pragmatism stands for openmindedness and ongoing 
debate.’8 In March 2008, Obama’s national security advisory team recommended 
that ‘pragmatism over ideology’ serve as his diplomatic lodestar. As Jo Becker 
and Scott Shane write in the New York Times, ‘it was counsel that only reinforced 
the president’s instincts’.9 Of course, the defining traits of pragmatism are almost 
comically out of step with the polarization of contemporary American politics. 
But Obama hews closely to them all the same.
The President approaches foreign policy on a case-by-case basis and purpose-
fully, deliberatively—rather too slowly at times—examines the merits or demerits 
of any given case. ‘When you start applying blanket policies on the complexities 
of the current world situation,’ Obama told NBC News in 2011, ‘you’re just going 
to get yourself into trouble.’10 This has been Obama’s core method from his rise 
to political prominence through his presidency to date. Some observations—such 
as his promise to ‘protect the American people and to expand opportunity for the 
next generation’—are taken from the bumper book of presidential boilerplate.11 
Others, such as his comment to voters in Pennsylvania ‘that my foreign policy 
is actually a return to the traditional bipartisan realistic policy of George Bush’s 
father, of John F. Kennedy, of, in some ways, Ronald Reagan’ better captures his 
desire to engage with the world as it is, not as it should or might be—without 
geostrategic prejudice.12 Yet realism, as James Lindsay observes, does not really 
8 James T. Kloppenberg, Reading Obama: dreams, hope, and the American political tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2011), p. xiii.
9 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, ‘Secret Kill list proves a test of Obama’s principles and will’, New York Times, 
26  May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?page 
wanted=2&hp, accessed 18 July 2012.
10 Ryan Lizza, ‘The consequentialist’, New Yorker, 2 May 2011.
11 Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American leadership’, Foreign Affairs 84: 2, July–Aug. 2007, p. 2.
12 Quoted in James M. Lindsay, ‘George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership’, 
International Affairs 87: 4, July 2011, p. 773.
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capture his philosophical core: ‘a more accurate description of how Obama viewed 
foreign policy was pragmatism rather than realism’.13 
There is another reason why characterizing Obama as a realist is insufficient: 
the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr on his diplomatic world-view. In an interview 
with the New York Times journalist David Brooks, Obama praised Niebuhr for his 
‘compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain. And we 
should be humble and modest in our belief that we can eliminate these things. But 
we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction.’14 Niebuhr operated 
in the realist foreign policy tradition, but his devout Christianity tempered the 
amorality engendered by its purest application. As Andrew Preston observes in 
Sword of the spirit, shield of faith: ‘Without religion, Niebuhr argued, realism would 
inevitably lead the nation astray because it would lack a moral compass and 
thus lack moral purpose, but without realism, religion could also be damaging 
because of its tendency to veer off into destructive, idealistic crusades.’15 Obama 
read and came to admire Niebuhr while teaching at the University of Chicago 
Law School. Niebuhr’s critique of John Dewey—for failing to comprehend that 
self-interest drove humanity more than any other single force, and for being led 
by his worthy pacific tendencies to ignore the reality that the existence of evil 
meant some wars had to be fought to complete victory—struck a resonant chord 
with Obama.16 This was the central message of the President’s Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech in Oslo in December 2009, in which he discussed, and rejected 
as inadequate, the Christian pacifism of Martin Luther King, Jr:
We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict 
in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations—acting individually or in concert—
will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified … I face the world as it 
is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. Evil does exist in 
the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations 
cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms. 17
Here, in a similar fashion to his speech in Chicago, Obama was challenging the 
preconceptions of the audience, distinguishing his foreign policy views from 
those of the conventional left. In both speeches two giants of American liber-
alism—respectively, Jesse Jackson and Martin Luther King, Jr—are used as foils 
instead of models. Writing in the New Yorker, George Packer observed that ‘the 
spirit of Niebuhr presided over the Nobel address. Neither idealist nor realist, 
Obama seemed to be saying that universal values and practical geopolitics exist 
in the same tension as war and peace.’18 It is in this amalgam of pragmatism and 
Niebuhrian realism that Obama’s belief-system is most accurately situated.
13 Lindsay, ‘George W. Bush, Barack Obama’, p. 773.
14 David Brooks, ‘Obama, gospel and verse’, New York Times, 26 April 2007, http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/04/26/opinion/26brooks.html?_r=1&ref=reinholdniebuhr, accessed 18 July 2012.
15 Andrew Preston, Sword of the spirit, shield of faith: religion in American war and diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 2012), 
p. 611.
16 Kloppenberg, Reading Obama, p. 121.
17 Quoted in Preston, Sword of the spirit, p. 612.
18 George Packer, ‘Peace and war’, http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/12/21/091221taco_talk_
packer, New Yorker, 21 Dec. 2009, accessed 18 July 2012.
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In such circumstances, self-identified Wilsonians have found themselves in a 
challenging environment. Samantha Power, a close adviser to Obama when he 
was a candidate, has struggled to exert influence from her marginal post as Senior 
Director of Multilateral Affairs at the NSC. This seemed to change last year 
during the debate on the merits of military intervention in Libya, when some 
pundits observed that Power had returned to the fore in making a forceful case 
for intervention.19 There is some truth to these observations—but only relatively 
speaking. The manner of the intervention bears all of Obama’s incremental 
decision-making hallmarks. And most observers ascribe a more significant role 
to David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy in persuading Obama to enter the fray.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, a self-described ‘humanitarian hawk’ and devotee of 
Woodrow Wilson, certainly found it difficult to make her voice heard in the 
Obama administration. After resigning from her position as chair of the Policy 
Planning Council in February 2011, Slaughter complained that the ‘world of 
low politics, “soft power”, human rights, democracy, and development’ was 
being marginalized. That women tended to concentrate on such issues—while 
realist-inclined men such as Robert Gates and Thomas Donilon operated instead 
in what they viewed as the more significant realm of nation-states and hard 
power—was a significant problem: ‘One of the best parts of my time here has 
been the opportunity to work with so many amazing and talented women—truly 
extraordinary people. But Washington still has a ways to go before their voices 
are fully heard and respected.’20 Slaughter despaired of Obama’s equivocation on 
the Libyan intervention, observing pointedly: ‘You can’t be a little bit realist and 
a little bit democratic when deciding whether to stop a massacre.’21 A supporter 
of the 2003 Iraq War, Slaughter became yet more hawkish in February 2012 when 
she argued in a New York Times op-ed that ‘foreign military intervention in Syria 
offers the best hope for curtailing a long, bloody and destabilizing war’.22
Of course, one of Slaughter’s major disappointments—which she tactfully 
did not mention—was that the woman who hired her, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, sided with Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on virtually 
every major issue that crossed her desk. Clinton is no Wilsonian idealist; instead, 
she has supported the President’s cautious diplomacy with unstinting loyalty. 
Indeed, her alliance with Gates has been a source of great stability and reassurance 
to Obama, allowing him to set the foreign policy direction that best suits his 
ideational core without needing to worry about dissent from the big hitters in the 
Cabinet. ‘I’m not sure if he considers this an insult or a compliment,’ Obama told 
the veteran journalist Bob Woodward in reference to Robert Gates, ‘but he and I 
actually think a lot alike, in broad terms.’23 Having a like-minded Secretary of State 
and Defense Secretary in post has neutralized a problem that presidents often face: 
19 Tom Hayden, ‘Samantha Power goes to war’, The Nation, 30 March 2011, http://www.thenation.com/
article/159570/samantha-power-goes-war, accessed 18 July 2012.
20 Hayden, ‘Samantha Power goes to war’.
21 Lizza, ‘The consequentialist’.
22 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘How to halt the butchery in Syria’, New York Times, 23 Feb. 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/02/24/opinion/how-to-halt-the-butchery-in-syria.html, accessed 18 July 2012.
23 Bob Woodward, Obama’s wars: the inside story (London: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 290.
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major egos at odds on policy against the constant and destabilizing backdrop of 
empire-building on the part of the Pentagon and (less frequently and successfully) 
State Department. If Obama defeats Romney in November 2012, it is difficult 
to imagine the President appointing a successor to Hillary Clinton whose views 
diverge much from his own. Barack Obama’s dominance is likely to continue.
‘Pragmatism plus Niebuhr’ in practice
Writing in the Weekly Standard in July 2009, Matthew Continetti described Obama’s 
foreign policy as the ‘good Niebuhr policy’—a pun on Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘good 
neighbor policy’ towards Latin America. Of course, Continetti invokes Niebuhr 
to shame Obama rather than praise him. He castigates what he views as Obama’s 
shamefully passive response to the improprieties of the Iranian election of 12 June 
that returned President Ahmadinejad to power with an implausible 63 per cent 
of the vote. As demonstrations spread across Iran, Obama declined to lend any 
vocal or material support to the discontented—who clearly had right on their 
side—doing little beyond what he described as ‘bearing witness’. Continetti found 
Obama’s response to the thwarted revolution in Iran both morally bankrupt and 
strategically inept:
The realists’ lackadaisical attitude in the face of democratic fervor is partly a consequence 
of their view that a regime’s character is largely irrelevant to its foreign policy. It is partly 
confirmation that Obama’s team is more interested in restricting the scope of American 
ideals, interests, and ambitions than in capitalizing on moments when history might shift 
decisively in our favor. But, taken as a whole, such a mindset isn’t ‘realistic’. It’s obtuse.24
Obama’s caution in the face of momentous events in the Middle East has remained 
constant through his presidency to date. Each proto-revolution has been met with 
trepidation—for shifts in power in that region are messy and unsettling, and can 
have major economic repercussions—followed by cautious rhetorical support, 
followed by a strong statement that the leader in question should listen to the 
people and depart with all due haste, followed by deliberation on the best way 
to effect such change without committing substantial US resources. ‘Leading 
from behind’ is how one anonymous White House aide self-destructively 
though accurately described Obama’s policy towards Libya.25 This method was 
certainly applied with respect to the revolutions in Egypt and Libya, though not 
with respect to demonstrations in Bahrain, where respecting the wishes of that 
country’s powerful, oil-rich neighbour Saudi Arabia far outweighed concerns 
about the divisive and repressive leadership practised by the minority Sunni Al 
Khalifa royal family in this majority Shi’i nation. In fine, Obama’s response to the 
‘Arab Spring’ has been defined by his determination to react on a case-by-case basis 
24 Matthew Continetti, ‘A good Niebuhr policy’, Weekly Standard 14: 40, 13 July 2009, http://staging.
weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/692zjhne.asp?page=2, accessed May 26, 2012.
25 John Rogin, ‘Who really said Obama was “leading from behind”?’, Foreign Policy/The Cable, 27 Oct. 2011, 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/27/who_really_said_obama_was_leading_from_behind, 
accessed 18 July 2012.
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and not to allow ‘ideology’ to influence the decision-making process. All is finely 
calibrated, little is instinctual.
An important aspect of Obama’s diplomacy is that he is at home with the 
complexities of practising diplomacy in a world in which power is increasingly 
diffuse. The President has elevated the significance of the G20 vis-à-vis the G8. 
This was done not just to anticipate global power shifts before they became fully 
realized, but to give the rising powers of the developing world a greater stake in 
what he describes as the management of the ‘global commons’—issues such as 
trade, development, climate change, nuclear proliferation that transcend the ken 
and capacities of the individual nation-states and that necessarily must be tackled 
collectively.26 Along these lines, Obama has made a concerted effort to accord 
greater respect to America’s export earnings-gorged creditor China, and to allay 
that nation’s sensitivities regarding its place at the top table. He has also devoted 
closer attention to India than his predecessor, calling for its admission to the UN 
Security Council as a permanent member.
If the Old World feels slighted by some of these decisions, then it simply has 
to absorb the blow to its prestige, adapt to reduced circumstances and focus on its 
own economic rehabilitation. As Indyk and his colleagues write, ‘if the United 
States would have to accept a diminished role as “first among equals” so too would 
Europe have to adjust by making room for the emerging powers to take their 
seats at the table, whether it be in the G-20, the International Monetary Fund, or 
an eventually enlarged Security Council’.27 Europe’s relative economic decline is 
far more pronounced than that of the United States. The multilateral apparatus 
of today was crafted in the mid-twentieth century and is truly showing its age. 
Reading the runes and acting accordingly is the closest we have to an Obama 
doctrine.
In the main, Obama has pursued a cautious, reactive foreign policy. But there 
has been one major exception to this rule: the President’s strong position on the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the diminishing circumstances under which 
he might order their use. In Prague on 5 April 2009, Obama vowed to ‘put an 
end to Cold War thinking’ and to ‘reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our 
national security strategy and urge others to do the same’. Most  dramatically, 
echoing Ronald Reagan during his second term, Obama vowed ‘to seek the 
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’. In April 2010,  President 
Obama’s ‘nuclear posture review’ added substance to these aspirations. Most 
signi ficantly, the document announced that ‘the United States will not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are party to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear 
non- proliferation obligations’.28 
At face value, this is hardly the most radical of steps: if you renounce a weapon 
that we possess in abundance, we promise not to destroy you with it—unless 
26 See Indyk et al., Bending history, pp. 13–14.
27 Indyk et al., Bending history, p. 14.
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provoked. But the change is more significant than scholars like Michael S. Gerson 
allow. It is historically unprecedented for a pre-eminent nation to forswear the 
use—even in part—of its most powerful weapon. Obama’s stance is primarily a 
moral one, and it is to his credit that he has taken the lead at the height of his power 
rather than afterwards. Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger 
and George Shultz all came round to the inescapable logic of nuclear disarmament 
late in their careers, after their influence had largely been spent.29 It is significant 
that Obama announced his intentions during the first hundred days: at the zenith 
of his power. There remains a distance yet to go, however, if the President is to 
realize the visionary and ambitious goal he set the world at Prague. While Gerson 
is excessively downbeat in observing that ‘the NPR’s new declaratory policy is 
little more than calculated ambiguity by another name’, he is absolutely correct 
to note the huge gulf between Obama’s ultimate goal and the reality as it stands.
In many ways Obama is still bathing in the glory of the raid that killed Osama 
bin Laden. It is the defining moment of his presidency to date, and its impact 
on the public consciousness should not be underestimated. It is likely to prove 
a significant weapon for the incumbent in the forthcoming presidential debates. 
Elsewhere, Obama has subscribed to pragmatic principles in his response to 
upheavals in the Arab world and in the manner of his escalation of the war in 
Afghanistan. Bob Woodward’s Obama’s wars provides strong testament to both the 
President’s caution and his decisiveness in rejecting military advice he viewed as 
deficient on the basis of cost–benefit analysis. The President may be expected to 
manage the de-escalation with similar focus and hard-headedness. On Iran, finally, 
Obama tried engagement, received no encouraging response, and so has imposed 
strong sanctions and kept all options firmly on the table regarding Tehran’s nuclear, 
and wider strategic, ambitions.30 As David E. Sanger wrote recently in the New 
York Times: ‘The economic sanctions Mr. Obama has imposed have been far more 
crippling to the Iranian economy than anything President Bush did.’31
When Obama assumed the presidency, he told an adviser: ‘I’m inheriting a 
world that could blow up any minute in half a dozen ways, and I will have some 
powerful but limited and perhaps even dubious tools to keep it from happening.’32 
Little has changed over four years to soften this assessment. But it is clear that the 
President has displayed little queasiness in applying these ‘dubious tools’ and has 
shown a remarkably firm foreign policy hand—particularly when one considers 
the epithets McCain and Palin threw at him in 2008 regarding his naivety and 
weakness. Criticizing Obama’s record presents Mitt Romney with a formidable 
challenge.
29 See McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, ‘Nuclear weapons and 
the Atlantic alliance’, Foreign Affairs 60: 4, Spring 1982, pp. 753–68; Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William 
J. Perry and George P. Shultz, ‘Toward a nuclear-free world’, Wall Street Journal, 15 Jan. 2008.
30 See Trita Parsi, A single roll of the dice: Obama’s diplomacy with Iran (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).
31 David E. Sanger, ‘Is there a Romney Doctrine?’, New York Times Sunday Review, 12 May 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/05/13/sunday-review/is-there-a-romney-doctrine.html?pagewanted=1, accessed 18 July 
2012.
32 Woodward, Obama’s wars, p. 11.
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The sources of Mitt Romney’s hypothetical foreign policy
Unlike Richard Nixon or John F. Kennedy, Mitt Romney has spent little time 
gathering foreign policy experience—or indeed reading or writing much on 
the subject—prior to running for president. He spent 30 months as a Mormon 
missionary in France, which taught him something about resilience. As he recalled 
in 2002, ‘it’s quite an experience to go to Bordeaux and say, “Give up your 
wine! I’ve got a great religion for you.”’33 (Had Romney known how politically 
disadvantageous in America it was to speak French, he might never have gone.) 
After returning from France he studied English at Brigham Young University 
in Utah, graduating with the highest honours in 1971. From there he moved to 
Harvard, where he gained a joint JD/MBA from the law and business schools. 
The programme was highly intensive and selective, its 15 students representing 
something of an elite within an elite. As Romney’s biographers Michael Kranish 
and Scott Helman write: ‘Academically, the law school was more theoretical, the 
business school more practical. Harvard Law … relied largely on textbooks and 
instruction. The business school revolved around the case study method, in which 
students dissected real life business decisions to learn to think like managers and 
executives.’34 Romney performed well on both strands, though slightly better on 
business. Of course, Barack Obama also studied at Harvard Law School, where he 
developed a deep interest in jurisprudence and constitutional law, becoming the 
first African American editor of the Harvard Law Review. Romney’s and Obama’s 
experiences of Harvard were thus quite different. Obama sought out the ideas best 
suited to alleviating poverty and injustice; Romney located efficiency methods 
and the best means to secure competitive advantage. Obama left Harvard for a 
career in academia and grassroots politics, Romney for management consulting 
and private equity.
Romney’s successful and lucrative career at Bain and Company is a major source 
of contention between the candidates in the domestic sphere. It provides few clues 
as to his foreign policy views beyond the obvious one: that Romney has an eye 
for opportunity, is ruthless when implementing a plan, and is adept at immersing 
himself in the detail of whatever problem he is charged with solving. These skills 
were certainly brought to bear in 1999 when he was appointed president and 
CEO of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic 
Games of 2002. Romney is widely credited with rescuing a fiasco in the making. 
He attracted corporate sponsorship and lobbied Congress with aplomb. He also 
addressed and disarmed the fears of local critics, ensuring that Salt Lake City came 
out of the experience with a high-quality infrastructural legacy. It is tempting to 
infer from this experience that Romney might prove a dab hand at managing both 
alliances and bilateral relationships.
Though he works hard to shield or obscure his actual record from the angry 
glare of his party’s right wing, Romney’s gubernatorial record in Massachusetts 
33 Katha Pollitt, review of The real Romney by Michael Kranish and Scott Helman, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
books/2012/apr/18/the-real-romney-review, Guardian, 18 April 2012, accessed 18 July 2012.
34 Michael Kranish and Scott Helman, The real Romney (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), p. 92.
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provides the most interesting clues to his potential approach to foreign policy. 
After all, the world Romney would like to lead more closely resembles pluralist 
Massachusetts than a bloc of Republican primary voters. His landmark achievement 
in Massachusetts, a health care bill making it mandatory for citizens of that state 
to possess health insurance, is testament to all Romney’s talents as an analyst 
and pragmatic deal-maker. At the lavish signing ceremony in Faneuil Hall on 12 
April 2006, Senator Edward Kennedy joined Romney on stage. The two men 
exchanged jokes and warm words, the latter observing prophetically that ‘this is an 
achievement for all the people of our commonwealth and perhaps for the rest of 
America, too’.35 Romney had earlier remarked that ‘there really wasn’t Republican 
or Democrat in this. People ask me if this is conservative or liberal, and my answer 
is yes. It’s liberal in the sense that we’re getting our citizens health insurance. It’s 
conservative in that we’re not getting a government takeover.’36 Again, Romney’s 
hardwired centrism—his unerring focus on the achievement of results irrespective 
of ‘ideology’—was amply on display. There is little here to suggest that Romney’s 
foreign policy will follow the ideologically driven objectives of George W. Bush.
Parsing Romney’s career is certainly a useful exercise in identifying clues to his 
diplomatic tastes, but what of the written record? As Romney was a governor, 
not a senator—he failed in his attempt to unseat Ted Kennedy in 1994—the paper 
trail is thin. As a serious presidential candidate in 2007, he was commissioned 
to write a foreign policy thought-piece for Foreign Affairs. The purpose of the 
article—which carried the anodyne title ‘Rising to a new generation of global 
challenges’—was to mollify and reassure in a polarized political environment. 
In it, he staked out little new ground, instead identifying points of agreement 
among realists and neo-conservatives, a classic piece of Romneyan triangulation. 
Throughout the article Romney sets himself up as the grown-up in the room: ‘More 
broadly, lines have been drawn between those labeled “realists” and those labeled 
“neoconservatives.” Yet these terms mean little when even the most committed 
neoconservative recognizes that any successful policy must be grounded in reality 
and even the most hardened realist admits that much of the United States’ power 
and influence stems from its values and ideals.’ Romney went on to observe that 
America was in need of ‘an overarching strategy that can unite the United States 
and its allies’, but cautioned that this should be formed ‘not around a particular 
political camp or foreign policy school but around a shared understanding of 
how to meet a new generation of challenges’.37 Again, Romney’s emphasis is on 
achieving results, not on pursuing agendas. The method deployed in addressing 
any given foreign policy challenge should vary depending on its nature.
Beyond the 2007 Foreign Affairs article there is his campaign website, of course, 
although there is little there that is revelatory. Its summation of the Romney 
foreign policy approach is vapid: ‘The unifying thread of his national security 
strategy is American strength. When America is strong, the world is safer. It is 
35 Kranish and Helman, The real Romney, p. 277.
36 David Corn, ‘Mitt Romney: how long can he steer clear of GOP craziness?’, http://www.politicsdaily.
com/2011/03/08/romney-how-long-can-he-steer-clear-of-gop-craziness/, accessed 18 July 2012.
37 Mitt Romney, ‘Rising to a new generation of global challenges’, Foreign Affairs 86: 4, July–Aug. 2007.
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only American power—conceived in the broadest terms—that can provide the 
foundation for an international system that ensures the security and prosperity of 
the United States and our friends and allies.’38
Romney’s speech at the Citadel in October 2011 had more substance; indeed, 
it was his most important foreign policy speech to date. Its primary goal was to 
characterize Barack Obama as defeatist and out of tune with American values—
in more or less the same way that Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson and Ronald 
Reagan lambasted Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. So Romney stated: ‘I believe 
we are an exceptional country with a unique destiny and role in the world. Not 
exceptional, as Obama has derisively said, in the way that the British think Great 
Britain is exceptional or the Greeks think Greece is exceptional. In Barack Obama’s 
profoundly mistaken view there is nothing exceptional about the United States.’39 
The important difference between then and now is that, notwithstanding his 
excessive regard for nuance, Barack Obama is not in fact a narrow Spenglerian-
influenced realist, consumed by doubts about the ability of Americans—and 
democracies at large—to comprehend geopolitical subtleties and act accordingly. 
Obama is as devoted to realizing ‘another American century’ as Romney. More 
importantly, little in his résumé suggests that Romney is a neo-conservative in 
the making. Romney is pursuing a bellicose strategy vis-à-vis Obama’s alleged 
passivity because he believes it will resonate with voters—not because it comes 
from within.
The Romney brains trust
That Obama is no Kissinger was revealed in a meeting the President held with 
news anchors just prior to his 2012 State of the Union address, when he devoted a 
full ten minutes to complimenting Robert Kagan’s recently published essay in The 
New Republic, ‘Not fade away: the myth of American decline’. The President cited 
Kagan’s optimism about America’s geostrategic future—and his sharp dismissal 
of the naysayers who overemphasized the extent of America’s decline—as a 
significant influence on his own diplomatic thinking.40 National Security Advisor 
Thomas Donilon appeared on Charlie Rose’s television show, talking in detail 
about ‘Kagan’s essay and Obama’s love of it’.41 The essay—drawn from Kagan’s 
then forthcoming book The world America made—contained few insights that the 
President would dispute, even though Kagan partly intended it as a critique of 
Obama:
38 ‘An American century: a strategy to secure America’s enduring interests and ideals’, http://www.mittromney.
com/collection/foreign-policy, accessed 18 July 2012.
39 ‘Mitt Romney delivers remarks on US foreign policy’, http://www.mittromney.com/blogs/mitts-view/ 
2011/10/mitt-romney-delivers-remarks-us-foreign-policy.
40 The naysayers are legion, and some have been saying nay, as Kagan has noted pointedly, for a very long time. 
Two recently published ‘declinist’ accounts are Charles Kupchan’s No-one’s world: the West, the rising rest, and 
the coming global turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) and Andrew Bacevich, ed., The short American 
century: a postmortem (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
41 Ezra Klein, ‘Wonkbook: Robert Kagan, Obama’s favorite Romney adviser’, 30 Jan. 2012, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/wonkbook-robert-kagan-obamas-favorite-romney-adviser/ 
2012/01/30/gIQAj1wEcQ_blog.html, accessed 18 July 2012.
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The present world order is as fragile as it is unique. Preserving it has been a struggle in 
every decade and will remain a struggle in the decades to come. Those presidents who have 
come to office expecting to be able to do less have quickly faced the stark reality—often 
more apparent to presidents than presidential candidates—that preserving the present 
world order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment.42
Obama’s endorsement of Kagan was probably genuine. It was incontrovertibly 
savvy. Not only did Obama thereby smartly position himself on the side of 
Reaganian optimism, he also robbed Mitt Romney of the added value that Kagan 
provided to his campaign.
Kagan served as an adviser to John McCain in 2008 and he adds heft to 
Romney’s foreign policy credentials this time round. Commonly but misleadingly 
identified as a neo-conservative—he does not recommend the blanket export of 
American values—Kagan believes in the indispensability of American power and 
geostrategic primacy.43 Yet it is difficult to identify many substantive differences 
between Kagan’s counsel and the substantive aspects of Obama’s diplomacy—
at least beyond the manner of its presentation. This reality was partly laid bare 
in February 2012, when Romney published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal 
criticizing the incomplete nature of the President’s ‘pivot’ in Asia and his general 
handling of relations with China:
President Obama came into office as a near supplicant to Beijing, almost begging it to 
continue buying American debt so as to finance his profligate spending here at home 
… Now, three years into his term, the president has belatedly responded with a much-
ballyhooed ‘pivot’ to Asia, a phrase that may prove to be as gimmicky and vacuous as his 
‘reset’ with Russia. The supposed pivot has been oversold and carries with it an unintended 
consequence: It has left our allies with the worrying impression that we left the region and 
might do so again … Unless China changes its ways, on day one of my presidency I will 
designate it a currency manipulator and take appropriate counteraction. A trade war with 
China is the last thing I want, but I cannot tolerate our current trade surrender.44
Not long after Romney’s article was published, Kagan appeared on the tele vision 
show The Colbert Report, where he was asked if he endorsed any aspects of Obama’s 
diplomacy. A fair-minded scholar, Kagan replied: ‘I think he has a good policy 
in Asia, particularly in dealing with China. I think he’s strengthened our position 
in Asia with our allies.’ Had Romney not at that point been trying to close the 
ideological gap with Rick Santorum, one senses he might have agreed with 
Kagan.45
42 Robert Kagan, The world America made (New York: Knopf, 2012), p. 134.
43 Readers will be hard pressed to locate the idealistic strain commonly attributed to ‘neo-conservatives’ in any 
of his books, which include Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order (New York: Knopf, 
2003), Dangerous nation: America’s place in the world from the earliest days to the dawn of the twentieth century (New 
York: Knopf, 2006) and The return of history and the end of dreams (New York: Knopf, 2008).
44 Mitt Romney, ‘How I’ll respond to China’s rising power’, Wall Street Journal, 16 Feb. 2012, http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052970204880404577225340763595570.html, accessed 18 July 2012.
45 Ali Gharib, ‘Romney adviser Robert Kagan: Obama has  “good policy in Asia, particularly in dealing with 
China”’, Thinkprogress Security, 22 Feb. 2012, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/02/22/430809/kagan-
romney-obama-china/?mobile=nc, accessed 18 July 2012.
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Aaron L. Friedberg, a professor of politics and international relations at 
Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, is 
another of Romney’s foreign policy advisers. His 2011 book, A contest for supremacy: 
China, America, and the struggle for mastery in Asia, issues a stern warning that the 
United States is ‘on track to lose’ the strategic battle for power and influence in the 
Western Pacific.46 He chides the Obama administration for focusing too intently 
on engagement with Beijing and not devoting sufficient resources to contingency 
planning should the worst-case scenario materialize in the form of armed conflict 
over any number of issues.
This was a damning critique when Friedberg wrote the book, but less so in the 
months after it was published. In November 2011, the President announced that 
the United States would station an additional 2,500 troops in northern Australia: 
their strategic purpose was clear enough and China was predictably nonplussed. 
In addition, Secretary of State Clinton has been proactive in encouraging Burma 
(Myanmar) to move in the direction of genuine independence and pull itself 
away from Beijing’s orbit. Finally, the Obama administration has been steadfast in 
supporting the Philippines over China’s strong-armed approach to their territorial 
dispute in the South China Sea. On the deck of a US warship in Manila Bay—
one need not be Freudian to discern a message—Secretary of State Clinton 
announced that ‘we are making sure that our collective defense capabilities 
and communications infrastructure are operationally and materially capable 
of deterring provocations from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors’. 
Ramon Casiple, executive director of the Manila-based Institute for Political and 
Economic Reform, observed that ‘Filipinos appreciate symbolism’.47
In a similar fashion to Romney, therefore, Obama has met and disarmed his 
critics by doing or saying much of what they suggest. The President is no George 
McGovern—a bona fide left-wing Democrat trounced by Richard Nixon in the 
election of 1972—much as Republican strategists would like to portray him that 
way. So Obama is well placed to parry the critique of a Kagan or a Friedberg, 
meaning that Romney will have to turn to his über-hawks if he genuinely wants 
to attack Obama’s record. He may pursue this option, of course, though it is 
probable that he will critically injure his electoral prospects in so doing. 
In May 2012 Colin Powell queried the quality of the foreign policy advice Mitt 
Romney was receiving. On MSNBC’s Morning Joe, he cautioned: ‘I don’t know 
who all of his advisers are, but I’ve seen some of the names and some of them are 
quite far to the right. And sometimes they might be in a position to make judgments 
or recommendations to the candidate that should get a second thought.’48 
46 Aaron L. Friedberg, A contest for supremacy: China, America, and the struggle for mastery in Asia (New York: W.  W. 
Norton & Company, 2011).
47 Quoted in Floyd Whaley, ‘Clinton reaffirms military ties with the Philippines’, New York Times, 16 Nov. 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/clinton-reaffirms-military-ties-with-the-philippines.html, 
accessed 18 July 2012.
48 Rachel Weiner, ‘Colin Powell questions Mitt Romney’s foreign policy, comes out in support of gay marriage’, 
Washington Post, 23 May 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/colin-powell-questions-
mitt-romneys-foreign-policy-comes-out-in-support-of-gay-marriage/2012/05/23/gJQApcbLlU_blog.html, 
accessed 18 July 2012.
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While John Bolton and Cofer Black—the head of the CIA’s counterterrorism 
programme under George W. Bush, described memorably by journalist Eli Lake 
as ‘Romney’s envoy to the dark side’—were always likely to raise Powell’s hackles, 
Kagan and Friedberg are simply not as strident and unburdened by doubt as Paul 
Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld.49 Of course, there is always the chance that 
Romney might try something bold to enliven the Republican base—which in this 
case would be citing Bolton and Black as his north and south stars—just as John 
McCain did in selecting Sarah Palin as his running-mate. But it seems more likely 
that Romney will resist the temptation to evoke doom-laden scenarios requiring 
strenuous military effort when the nation remains so mired in debt. Peter Feaver, a 
professor of political science at Duke University who served on George W. Bush’s 
National Security Council, has sensibly urged Romney to ‘walk back from reckless 
campaign promises’.50 The best available evidence suggests he will do exactly that. 
And if Romney does win the election in November, neo-conservatives are likely 
to find his administration as unwelcoming as Wilsonians have found Obama’s.
Conclusion
In his classic series of lectures on the meaning of pragmatism, William James 
observed that ‘at the outset, at least, it stands for no particular results. It has no 
dogmas, and no doctrines save its method … the attitude of looking away from 
first things, principles, “categories”, supposed necessities; and of looking towards 
last things, fruits, consequences, facts.’51 Both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney 
are classically pragmatic in that their manner of thinking is geared to the consid-
eration of facts and the anticipation of consequences; first principles are given 
short shrift.
There are clear differences in the two men’s styles—they clearly vary on the 
pragmatic theme. Romney’s manner of presentation consciously emulates Ronald 
Reagan’s smorgasbord of optimism, ideology and Manichaeism which was met 
with such public approval. But like Reagan in his second term, Romney is likely 
to act in ways substantively different from how he talks. Rich Williamson, a 
veteran Republican foreign policy adviser, has struggled to make the case that 
the candidates are unalike in significant ways. Williamson identifies ‘fundamental 
differences about a naive faith in engagement and a dangerous reliance on the 
Security Council versus having an approach where you have strength, where 
you’re willing to lead, and where you have strong relationships with our friends 
and allies’.52 But who could honestly say that Obama is not willing to lead or 
have strong relationships with friends and allies? And would the results-focused 
49 Eli Lake, ‘Meet Mitt Romney’s trusted envoy to the dark side, Cofer Black’, The Daily Beast, 11 April 2012, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/11/meet-mitt-romney-s-trusted-envoy-to-the-dark-side-
cofer-black.html, accessed 18 July 2012.
50 Peter Feaver, ‘Shadow government’ blog, Foreign Policy, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/2195, accessed 
18 July 2012.
51 William James, Pragmatism, ed. and intr. Bruce Kuklick (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), p. 29.
52 Jackie Northam, ‘Analysts try to define Romney’s foreign policy’, NPR, 4 June 2012, http://www.npr.
org/2012/06/04/154268367/analysts-try-to-define-romneys-foreign-policy, accessed 18 July 2012.
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Romney ignore the United Nations—and abjure engagement—when it might 
serve a useful function? Romney’s pragmatism is certainly not as intellectually or 
as deeply rooted as Obama’s. And the smokescreen of belligerence released by his 
advisers serves to obscure Romney’s instinctive caution. Nonetheless, Obama and 
Romney are largely cut from the same cloth.
As his Nobel address illustrated, the gap between President Obama’s rhetoric—
at least while in office—and his method is not so large. Few could have felt any 
great betrayal in the foreign policy that has followed the speech. Benjamin Rhodes, 
one of the President’s deputy national security advisers, was once asked to sketch 
the outline of an Obama Doctrine. ‘If you were to boil it all down to a bumper 
sticker,’ he replied, ‘it’s “Wind down these two wars, reestablish American standing 
and leadership in the world, and focus on a broad set of priorities, from Asia and 
the global economy to a nuclear nonproliferation regime”.’53 Of course, this is 
no doctrine—and it certainly wouldn’t fit on a bumper sticker. But this diffuse 
approach means that Obama is quite capable of amending a policy-in-progress 
if circumstances happen to change. Both he (and Romney) appear to share John 
Maynard Keynes’s view that ‘when the facts change I change my mind.’54 The 
absence of a doctrine makes Obama’s foreign policy supple.
Mitt Romney’s big idea appears to be that the United States is more than 
capable of leading the world for another century and that a pervasive negativity 
has neutered American leadership. This distinguishes his bold and distinctly 
American values from those that the Tea Party attribute to President Obama—
that he is un-American, a moral relativist, a ‘declinist’. So Romney’s principal 
foreign policy approach thus far has been predicated on using the President as 
a straw man. This has worked well through the Republican primaries—whose 
constituents largely view Obama as toxic—but the national stage is different. The 
fact that the straw man has praised Robert Kagan has disarmed one of Romney’s 
principal lines of attack. It will be interesting to see whether Romney persists in 
this approach through the remainder of the campaign and during the presidential 
debates. If he attacks Obama’s caution and timidity, then the President has a strong 
reply: George W. Bush showed that boldness is not always a virtue.
Writing in the Weekly Standard, William Kristol observed perceptively that 
‘Mitt Romney is an intelligent, hardworking, pragmatic problem-solver with a 
conservative disposition. He might as well present himself that way. It will be 
easier than any alternative self-presentation, and has the added advantage that 
it’s probably what a majority of the country wants right now. So we say to our 
fellow conservatives: Let Romney be Romney.’55 There is, of course, a blind spot 
in Kristol’s analysis: his first sentence also describes Barack Obama. Romney’s 
primary virtues—his competence and diligence—are also the President’s. A 
chasm certainly separates the candidates on domestic policy, and Congress is an 
alarmingly polarized and ineffectual place. On foreign policy, however, Obama’s 
53 Lizza, ‘The consequentialist’.
54 Quoted in Nicholas Wapshot, Keynes Hayek: the clash that defined modern economics (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, ), p. 83.
55 William Kristol, ‘Let Romney be Romney’, Weekly Standard 17: 33, 14 May 2012.
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and Romney’s shared method suggests that the ideational future of US foreign 
policy will be pragmatic. President Obama has shown his hand already. Romney, 
for his part, seems likely to follow the opposite trajectory to George W. Bush: 
moving from strident values-laden rhetoric on the campaign trail to moderation 
in the Oval Office. Romney’s biography certainly suggests he will do or say 
whatever it takes to win—an ‘etch-a-sketch’, as Romney adviser Eric Fehrnstrom 
ill-advisedly described him—and then govern as a results-driven centrist.56 Laying 
down plans with a permanent marker tends to concentrate the mind.
Robert Kagan is insightful when correcting declinist misperceptions regarding 
the extent of America’s decline, and the date at which China will become a true peer 
competitor. But a multitude of factors make it highly improbable that the United 
States would attempt to wage two wars—including one ‘of choice’—concurrently 
as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq.57 Pragmatism fell out of favour during the Cold 
War when grand ‘theories’ dominated foreign policy discourse and the principal 
opponent’s ideology had the declared aim of extinguishing all others.58 The Bush 
administration’s ‘war on terror’ sought to reinvigorate this existential dynamic, 
but few remain convinced that the magnitude of the threat posed by radical Islam 
is comparable to that formerly posed by Marxism/Leninism. Thus the stage is set 
for America’s principal contribution to philosophy—pragmatism—to guide its 
foreign policy.
56 Michael D. Shear, ‘For Romney’s trusted adviser, “etch a sketch” comment is a rare misstep’, New York Times, 
21 March 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/us/politics/etch-a-sketch-remark-a-rare-misstep-for-
romney-adviser.html, accessed 18 July 2012.
57 See Richard N. Haass, War of necessity, war of choice (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009).
58 See the epilogue to Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: a story of ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus 
& Giroux, 2001).

